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Introduction
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd 2 is a recent Hong Kong case
from the Court of Appeals (“C.A.”) concerning the enforcement of
Mainland Chinese awards in Hong Kong under the public policy exception. This case involved the use of an arbitration-mediation procedure,
which the respondents contended should have been grounds for refusing enforcement under the public policy exception in the Arrangement
Concerning the Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between
the Mainland and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“The
Arrangement”).3 In Hong Kong, the public policy exception is an onerJuris Doctor Candidate 2014, American University-Washington College of Law
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627 (C.A.).
3
See id; Arrangement Concerning the Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
Between the Mainland and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, P.R.C.H.K.S.A.R., Jun. 21, 1999.
1
2
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ous standard of proof; Gao Haiyan illustrates the need for a cultural
understanding of the place of arbitration when considering grounds for
refusing enforcement in Hong Kong.4 In addition to narrowly construing the exception, Hong Kong courts consider cultural aspects of the
situs of arbitration, thus further constraining the use of this exception.5
A mere violation of the enforcing jurisdiction’s arbitration regulations will not give rise to the exception; rather enforcement “must
violate the most basic notions of morality and justice.”6 Gao Haiyan
introduced a cultural sliding scale to this analysis by reinforcing the
preclusion of apparent bias as grounds for refusing enforcement under
the public policy exception. Hong Kong’s political and cultural position
makes this decision both desirable and necessary. But, for foreign businesses operating in China, it may reduce the chances of a favorable outcome in an enforcement action. Accordingly, these parties should take
advantage of the local rules and laws of both Hong Kong and Mainland
China in carefully drafting arbitration agreements to nullify these risks
As China’s prominence in the global economy grows, arbitration
proceedings concerning commercial disputes in China are becoming
more common. Enforcement of these Mainland awards is frequently
sought in Hong Kong.7 However, many parties seek to resist enforcement based on public policy grounds.8 Thus, practitioners must be
aware of Hong Kong’s political and cultural realities when seeking to
See id. at 659 (stating that while a mediation may have been conducted differently
in Hong Kong, it is important to consider how mediation is normally conducted in the
place it is conducted).
5
E.g., Hebei Import and Export Corp. v. Polytek Eng. Co., [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D.
665 (C.F.A.).
6
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627, 646 (C.A.).
7
See, e.g., Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd. v. Eton Properties Ltd., [2009] 4
H.K.L.R.D. 353 (C.A.) (granting enforcement of a CIETAC award);China Nanhai
Oil kkJoint Service Corporation Shenzen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co., [1995] 2
H.K.L.R.D. 215 (H.C.) (granting enforcement of a CIETAC award); Shandong Textiles
Import and Export Corp. v. Da Hua Non-Ferrous Metals Co., [2002] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 844
(C.F.I.) (granting enforcement of a CIETAC award).
8
E.g., Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd. 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 359, 361 (holding that
impossibility cannot be a public policy ground when the impossibility of performance
is self inflicted); Paklito Investment Ltd. v. Klockner East Asia Ltd, [1993] 2 H.K.L.R
39, 49 (H.C.) (holding the public policy exception will not be considered when failure
to present a case is sufficient); A v. R, [2009] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 389, 397 (C.F.I.) (holding
that the liquidated damages argument was not contrary to public policy because it was
not raised before the tribunal).
4

2013

The Public Policy Exception in Hong Kong

117

resist Mainland awards on public policy grounds.9 Practitioners must
particularly consider the differences between the judicial systems of
Hong Kong and the Mainland.10
Hong Kong’s legal code varies from that of Mainland China. While
Hong Kong is not a separate country from the People’s Republic of
China (“PRC”), it constitutes a Special Administrative Region (“SAR”).
Accordingly, the Arrangement, rather than the New York Convention
(“the Convention”), governs the enforcement of such awards. However,
both the Arrangement and the Convention contain similar provisions
allowing enforcing jurisdictions to refuse enforcement based on public
policy.11
The Chinese court system is a unitary system with four levels of
courts.12 The final court is the Supreme People’s Court; below it are the
high courts at the provincial level, the intermediate courts at the prefecture and the major municipality levels, and, the lowest courts, the basic
people’s courts at the county level.13 For the purposes of international
arbitration, the intermediate courts are the most important because the

Hong Kong was part of China until 1857, when it was handed over to the United
Kingdom for 150 years. Consequently, Hong Kong developed a common law system
based on the English tradition, importing important concepts and considerations
from that system. It is to be expected that this would create some tension after 1997,
when the United Kingdom handed Hong Kong back over to the Mainland. The “One
Country, Two Systems” paradigm emerged as a solution to ease this transition.
10
Id.
11
The New York Convention provides that “enforcement may be refused . . . [when]
. . . [t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country.” Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, art. 5, opened for signature Jun. 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3. The
Arrangement provides that “[t]he enforcement of [an] award may be refused if the
court of the Mainland holds that the enforcement of the arbitral award in the Mainland
would be contrary to the public interests of the Mainland, or if the court of the HKSAR
decides that the enforcement of the arbitral award in Hong Kong would be contrary to
the public policy of the HKSAR.” Arrangement Concerning the Mutual Enforcement
of Arbitral Awards Between the Mainland and Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, P.R.C.-H.K.S.A.R., Jun. 21, 1999 (hereinafter the Arrangement).
12
Zhou Jian, Judicial Intervention in International Arbitration: A Comparative
Study of the Scope of the New York Convention in U.S. and Chinese Courts, 15 Pac.
Rim & Pol’y J. 403, 407 (2006).
13
Id.
9
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confirmation of awards is sought in those courts.14 Moreover, these
courts maintain original jurisdiction for any disputes that involve significant foreign elements.15 In contrast, Hong Kong has a common law
system. Its hierarchal structure is similar to that of other common law
jurisdictions. At the top is the Court of Final Appeal (“C.F.A.”), then the
High Court, and below that the district courts. The High Court includes
both the Court of First Instance (“C.F.I.”) and the Court of Appeals
(“C.A.”).
The case involved a mediation-arbitration (“med-arb”) procedure.
In contrast to an arbitration proceeding, med-arb is a process by which
a mediator is appointed to resolve the dispute before an arbitration proceeding is commenced.16 The Hong Kong legislature has codified the
use of these procedures, whereas Western institutions regard med-arb
procedures with suspicion.17 The exposure of confidential information
is a major concern in med-arb procedures. An arbitrator, acting as a
mediator, may become exposed in unilateral communications to confidential information not available to the other side, or otherwise become
sympathetic to another party.18 It is questionable as to whether any
arbitrator can neutralize that risk, and, as a consequence, many arbitrators will refuse to mediate.19 Further complicating this process, many of
these mediation clauses have serious drafting issues.20
Nevertheless, mediation has a celebrated history in Chinese culture,
which is reflected by the extensive use of mediation in both civil judicial

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongcaifa (
) [The
Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Jan. 01, 1995) art. 58.
15
Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., April 9, 1991) art 19.
16
Kun Fan, The New Arbitration Ordinance in Hong Kong, Journal of Int’l Arb,
715, 718 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2012 Volume 29 Issue 6).
17
Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, Cap. 609, (2011) §§ 32–33.
18
Carlos de Vera, Arbitrating Harmony: “Med Arb” and the Confluence of Culture
and the Rule of Law in the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in China,
Colum. J. Asian L. 150, 156–58 (2004).
19
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd, [2011] H.K.E.C. 514. ¶ 77 (C.F.I.)
(overturned) by Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627
(C.A.).
20
Hyundai Eng. & Const. Co. v. Vigour Ltd., [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 723, 734 (C.A.)
(holding a mediation and conciliation contractual clause unenforceable because it
amounted to an agreement to agree without specified timetables).
14
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proceedings and arbitration. Mediation is rooted in Confucian values.21
During China’s dynastical phase, the concepts of li and fa competed for
dominance in China.22 The li concept gained favor, and under traditional
Chinese law, the courts expected Chinese society to take care of civil
disputes—characterized as “minor matters”—by itself.23 This notion
gave rise to the need for mediators in villages. The Chinese thus have
a strong inclination to mediate rather than to litigate, as litigation is
deemed as a breach of social harmony.24 Additionally, the advantages
of mediation in China are numerous. Guanxi, or one’s relations with
other people, is a central concept in Chinese culture. It is favorable to
preserve positive relations with others whenever possible. Mediation
can allow parties to save “face”, essentially their reputation before the
community, and it allows for the preservation of business relationships
by minimizing conflict in the dispute resolution process.25
Previously, mediation was an extrajudicial process, however it
became court-sponsored and tied to the legal system during Mao
Zedong’s reign. Court-sponsored mediation rose to importance, particularly in the context of divorces.26 Mao’s China was quick to draw a
contrast between what was regarded as a corrupt moral structure in the
West and Chinese values.27 An interventionist approach was taken on
divorce, using mediation as a process to preserve marriages.28 This use
of court sponsored mediation consequently shaped the whole judicial
system.29
Today, China boasts a network of professional mediators with more
than 6,800,000 members.30 While mediation is more common in the

E.g., Benjamin L. Read, Mediating the Mediation Debate: Conflict Resolution
and the Local State in China, 152 J. Conflict Resol., 725, 740 (2008).
22
Li represented the Confucian values of social harmony, and encouraged disputes
to be resolved amicably. In contrast, the more formalistic fa approach was embodied
in legalism, which advanced that the state should have a predominant role in life. Vera,
supra note 17 at 166–67. Vera, supra note 17 at 162, 166–67.
23
Jeiren Hu, Grand Mediation in China, 51 Asian Surv., 1065 (2006).
24
Phillip C. Huang, Court Mediation in China, Past and Present, 32 Modern China,
275, 279 (2006)
25
Vera, supra note 17, at 166–67.
26
Huang, supra note 23, at 287.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Read, supra note 20, at 738.
21
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countryside, it is also pervasive throughout the court system.31 One
study found that a high proportion of Chinese trial judges regard themselves as interventionists and will engage in mediation proceedings.32 In
many proceedings, an initial attempt at mediation is required before the
dispute will move forward.33 Judges conduct many of these mediations
in a context similar to med-arb.34 Similar to judges in court proceedings,
Chinese arbitrators often switch hats and become mediators, and then
go back to the role of arbitrator, sometimes on the presumption that
mediation is desired by the parties to preserve their relationship.35 In
fact, med-arb is a traditional method used at the China International
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”), the only
arbitral commission authorized to deal with foreign-related disputes.36
Hong Kong courts strongly value finality to litigation and comity.
This valuation is even more important in the case of the Mainland, given
the two jurisdictions’ common cultural history and political connections. This article will examine how several Hong Kong legal doctrines
allow it to reinforce those policy considerations. When resisting the
enforcement of a Mainland award based on public policy, the doctrines
of waiver and estoppel coupled with notions of fundamental justice
and morality are critical considerations for any party. Gao Haiyan has
made it clear that with regards to med-arb, a common procedure in the
Mainland, concepts such as the role of counsel and the appropriateness
of a med-arb procedure will be judged on a sliding cultural scale. The
sliding scale is only subordinated by instances of fraud, corruption, or
other universal public policies that would be fatal to an award.
I. Prior and Current Law
A. The Substantive Law & The Arrangement
Both the Arrangement and the Convention contain similar provisions allowing enforcement jurisdictions to refuse enforcement based

Id. at 739.
Huang, supra note 23, at 303.
33
Vera, supra note 17, at 173.
34
Id. at 181.
35
Id. at 185.
36
Lu Song, The New CIETAC Arbitration Rules of 2012, 29 J. Int’l Arb, 299, 309
(2012).
31
32
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on public policy.37 It provides that enforcement may be refused in the
Mainland if its enforcement would be contrary to the “public interests
of the Mainland” and, likewise, enforcement may be refused in Hong
Kong based on “public policy.”38
The arbitration of the principal case was conducted in China in
accordance with the PRC’s Arbitration Law (“the Law”). The Law
provides for the establishment of arbitration commissions throughout
the provinces, which must be registered with the judicial department
or municipalities directly under the Central Government.39 The Law
additionally provides that an arbitrator must withdraw from a case when
that person “meets a party or his agent in private, accepts an invitation
for dinner by a party or his representative or accepts gifts presented by
any of them,”40 or where the arbitrator has a relationship that may affect
impartiality.41 Article 35 provides that a party may submit a complaint
for the withdrawal of an arbitrator after the first hearing only if reasons
for the withdrawal become known after the start of the first hearing.42
The law further provides for a med-arb procedure if the parties consent
voluntarily.43 The award may be set aside if the composition of the tribunal or the procedure is contrary to law,44 or if the award is contrary to the
social and public interests.45

The New York Convention provides that “enforcement may be refused . . . [when] .
. . [t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy
of that country.” Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, art. 5, opened for signature Jun. 10, 1958 330 U.N.T.S. 3. The Arrangement
that “[t]he enforcement of [an] award may be refused if the court of the Mainland
holds that the enforcement of the arbitral award in the Mainland would be contrary
to the public interests of the Mainland, or if the court of the HKSAR decides that the
enforcement of the arbitral award in Hong Kong would be contrary to the public policy
of the HKSAR.” The Arrangement, P.R.C.-H.K.S.A.R., Jun. 21, 1999 (hereinafter the
Arrangement).
38
The Arrangement, P.R.C.-H.K.S.A.R., Jun. 21, 1999, art. 7.
39
The Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Jan. 01, 2000) art. 10.
40
Id. at art. 34 (4).
41
Id. at art. 34 (3).
42
Id. at art. 35.
43
Id. at art. 51.
44
The Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Jan. 01, 2000)
art.58(3).
45
Id. at art. 58(6).
37
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In Hong Kong, according to the Arbitration Ordinance, the enforcement of an award may be refused when a party is unable to present their
case,46 or it would be contrary to public policy to enforce the award.47
Both Convention and awards under the Arrangement may be refused
enforcement on identical grounds.48 49
PRC contract law governed the underlying contract, which gave
rise to the dispute in Gao Haiyan.50 Under PRC law, contracts that “are
manifestly unfair at the time the contract was concluded” or “concluded
by one party against the other party’s true intention through the use of
fraud, coercion, or exploitation of the other party’s precarious position”
will allow the injured party “to request the people’s court or an arbitration institution to modify or revoke it.”51
B. The Public Policy Exception in Hong Kong
The public policy exception is drawn narrowly in Hong Kong, and
can only be relied upon when “enforcement would be contrary to fundamental conceptions of morality and justice.”52 The enforcement of an
award obtained by fraud is one example of such a narrow standard.53 In
Hong Kong, when relying on the public policy exception as a defense, it
is important to raise it early, preferably during the arbitration. Where an
aspect of a public policy defense is not be available in another jurisdiction, Hong Kong courts will not apply the doctrine of estoppel to that
particular defense. The issues of waiver and estoppel are often present.
1. Hebei Import and Export Corp v. Polytek Engineering
The seminal case in Hong Kong for the enforcement of Mainland
awards on public policy grounds is Hebei Import and Export Corp v.
Polytek Engineering Co., which addresses waiver in a case of not raising
Arbitration Ordinance, (2011) Cap. 609 § 86(c)(ii).
Id. at § 86(2)(b).
48
Id. at §§ 89(2)(c)(ii), (3)(b).
49
Id. at §§ 95(2)(c)(ii), (3)(b).
50
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627, 632 (C.A.).
51
Id. at 635.
52
Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perushan Pertanbangan Minyak Dan Gas Bam Negara,
[2009] H.K.C.F.A.R. 84, 100 (C.F.A.) (holding that fraud is contrary to Hong Kong’s
fundamental notions of morality and justice). See also, J.J. Agro Indus. Ltd. v. Texuna
Int’l Ltd., [1994] 1 H.K.L.R. 89, 93 (H.C.) (holding the kidnapping of a witness
amounts to fraud under the public policy exception).
53
Karaha Bodas Co. H.K.C.F.A.R. at 100.
46
47

2013

The Public Policy Exception in Hong Kong

123

a defense before the Intermediate Courts of the PRC.54 The applicants
of this case sought to enforce a CIETAC award in Hong Kong, and the
respondents relied on public policy exception to resist enforcement.55
There, a chief arbitrator was present during the assessment of goods
with only the experts and in the absence of the sellers of the goods or
the other arbitrators.56 This defense was not raised in the arbitral proceedings nor at the Beijing Intermediate Court.
Ultimately, the court enforced the award. Speaking on behalf of
majority, Sir Anthony Mason identified four issues: first, whether the
respondents waived the defense by failing to raise it in the Beijing
Intermediate Court; second, whether the respondents could now resist
enforcement of the award because of the Chief Arbitrator’s communications; third, whether the Respondents were unable to present their case;
and finally, whether public policy was violated.57The court stressed that
comity and finality, subject to certain conditions, are critical policy considerations in Hong Kong.58 Regarding the issue of waiver, the court
noted that a failure to raise a public policy issue in a proceeding to set
aside an award in the supervisory jurisdiction does necessarily constitute
waiver.59 The court held that different jurisdictions have different public
policy interpretations and often public policy grounds are unavailable in
the supervising jurisdiction, so they may be raised in the enforcement

Heibei Import and Export Corp. v Polytek Eng’g Co., [1999] H.K.L.R.D. 665
(C.F.A.).
55
Id. at 669.
56
The seller was not able to examine the experts at the time of the meeting. However,
the sellers had the opportunity to challenge the experts’ opinions, and had ample time
later to present its case. Id.
57
Id. at 686.
58
Id. at 688. See also Shantou Zeng Ping Xu Yueli Shu Kuao Trading Co. v. Wesco
Polymers Ltd, [2002] H.K.E.C. 76, ¶ 17(invoking comity as a consideration for the
enforcement of an award attacked on the illegality of the underlying contract, which
had been found valid by the Beijing Intermediate Court); Qinghuangdao Tongda
Ent. Dev. Corp. v. Millan Basic Co., [1993] 1 H.K.L.R. 173, 176 (H.C.) (holding that
finality is an important public policy consideration in Hong Kong, and courts will not
reexamine disputes of fact).
59
Heibei Import and Export Corp. v Polytek Eng’g Co., [1999] H.K.L.R.D. 665,
688 (C.F.A.).
54

124

THE ARBITRATION BRIEF

Volume 3

jurisdiction.60 However, as in Hebei Import and Export Co., Hong Kong
courts will not tolerate parties keeping procedural defects “up the
sleeve” as to frustrate later enforcement actions.61
In his concurring opinion, Presiding Judge Litton noted that the
public policy exception is narrow, and the standards in an international
arbitration should exceed those for setting aside domestic awards.62
He also noted that while Hong Kong courts will not overlook cases of
actual bias, mere apparent bias is insufficient to trigger the public policy
exception. If the proceedings were conducted in such a manner that the
respondents were unable to present their case, then it would be unnecessary to rely on the public policy ground primarily because a separate
basis exists for resisting enforcement.63 This is a preferable ground for
refusing enforcement because of the desire to construe the public policy
exception as narrowly as possible.
2. Waiver & Estoppel
Another example of a case where waiver played a role in the
outcome is Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd. v. Eton Properties Ltd.64
In Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd., the applicants sought to enforce a
CIETAC award which granted the specific performance of a contract.65
The respondents relied on both impossibility and public policy arguSee id. See also Shanghai City Foundation Works Corp. v. Sunlink Ltd, [2001]
H.C.C.T. No. 83 of 200 (C.F.I.) (holding it is unusual to refuse enforcement on public
policy grounds when the supervising jurisdiction has upheld the award because it
leads to unusual injustice as the winning party may not seek a new arbitration in the
supervising jurisdiction).
61
Hebei Import and Export Corp., H.K.L.R.D at 688. See also A v. R, [2009] 3
H.K.L.R.D. 389, 397 (C.F.I.) (holding that a failure to raise a point concerning
liquidated damages, and not participating in the arbitration regarding that issue
amounted to a waiver); Paklito Investment Ltd v. Klockner Asia Ltd., [1993] 2 H.K.L.R.
39 (H.C.) (granting enforcement partially because respondents had not taken steps
to set aside the award in the supervising jurisdiction); Pacific China Holdings Ltd. v.
Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd., [2007] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 741, ¶ 15 (C.F.I.)(holding a case
of waiver had been made out where an award was attacked for apparent bias because
questionable communications between the arbitrators had not been objected to at the
arbitration).
62
Hebei Import and Export Corp., H.K.L.R.D at 675.
63
Id. at 676.
64
Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd. v. Eton Properties Ltd., [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 353,
356-57 (C.F.A.).
65
Id.
60
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ments before the C.A.;66 however, they did not raise the issue before
CIETAC,67 but instead filed an application that they later withdrew with
the Beijing Intermediate Court.68 The court held that a waiver had been
made out, as the respondents could have raised the defense at either
the first or second arbitration in the dispute, and here the impossibility
claim seemed like it had been self-inflicted.69
Waiver can also play a role in an attack on an arbitrator or a challenge to the composition of the tribunal. In China Nanhai Oil Joint
Service Corp. Shenzhen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co., the defendants
objected to the default appointment of an arbitrator.70 They raised the
objection to the Shenzhen sub-commissioner and were overruled.71
They did not pursue the available avenues of contacting the Chairman
or Vice Chairman of C.I.E.T.A.C.72 Furthermore, they did not raise the
issue before the full tribunal, but only brought up the defense with one
member.73 The court held that good faith considerations are relevant to
determining whether a party is estopped by the Mainland intermediate
courts, and had the defendants won, they would not have issued this
specific complaint.74
3. Bias & Med-Arb
With respect to the issue of bias, Hong Kong courts are reluctant to
find that technical violations automatically give rise to bias per se. For
example, in Pacific China Holdings,75 each party nominated an arbitrator, and the arbitrator who was nominated by the applicants contacted
the applicants’ attorney, their solicitor, unilaterally, thus giving rise

Id. at 359.
Id. at 360.
68
Id.
69
Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd. v. Eton Properties Ltd., [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 353,
360-61 (C.F.A.).
70
China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corp. Shenzhen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co.,
[1995] 2 H.K.L.R. 215 (H.C.).
71
Id. at 217.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.at 225–26.
75
Pacific China Holdings Ltd. v. Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd., [2007] 3 H.K.L.R.D.
741 (C.F.I. 2007).
66
67
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to a question of bias.76 The court held that unilateral communications
between an arbitrator and a party do not give rise to bias per se.77
With regard to voluntary med-arb proceedings, the relevant contractual clauses must be drafted with care in Hong Kong. In Hyundai
Engineering and Construction Co. v. Vigour Ltd., an arbitration clause
included a provision mandating the parties attempt conciliation.78 Upon
failing to reach an agreement, the contract sent the dispute to a third
party mediation procedure.79 The contract also included a clause that
provided “no party shall serve the other.”80 Due to the lack of certainty,
the negotiation and mediation provisions were unenforceable and were
merely agreements to agree.81 Moreover, a timetable of the dispute
resolution process is required.82 This rendered the whole agreement
unenforceable, opening the door to litigation.83
4. English and Singaporean Jurisprudence
The United Kingdom and Singapore legal systems provide useful
comparisons. Hong Kong’s legal structure is rooted in the common law
of the U.K, and Singapore is likewise a common law jurisdiction with
significant Chinese cultural influence. The seminal case from the U.K.
is Minimetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel which, like Gao Haiyan,
concerned a Mainland award.84 However, in Minimetals Germany
GmbH, the New York Convention governed the enforcement action.85
The underlying dispute regarded a contract for the sale of steel, and the
case was brought under an issue concerning the quality and dimensions
of that steel.86 The arbitral tribunal issued an award for the plaintiffs

Id. at ¶¶ 4-6.
Id. at ¶ 5 (holding that the unilateral communications did not give rise to apparent
bias because the solicitor did not complain about the communications, and that a fair
minded observer must find the communication as unfair or lack transparency).
78
Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co. v. Vigour Ltd., [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D.
723, 726 (C.A.).
79
Id. at 728.
80
Id. a 730.
81
Id. at 732.
82
Id. at 734.
83
Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co. v. Vigour Ltd., [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D.
723, 735 (C.A.)..
84
Minimetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel, (1999), C.L.C. 647, 648 (Comm.).
85
Id. at 656.
86
Id. at 649.
76
77
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on a subcontract.87 The defendants applied to the Beijing Intermediate
Court to revoke the award on grounds that the defendants were unable
to make a case because they did not have the opportunity to challenge
the arbitrator’s reliance on a sub-sale award, breaching Article 58 of
CIETAC rules.88 The Beijing Intermediate Court ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs.89
Enforcement was sought in the United Kingdom. The defendants
relied on a theory of breach of natural justice, an improper application of CIETAC rules, and that enforcement of the award would be
contrary to public policy.90 In determining whether the defendants had
been denied the opportunity to present their case, the court held that
the initial Beijing Court determination for resumed arbitration was to
allow the defendants to confront the original reliance on the sub-sale
award.91 Counsel felt that there was no jurisdiction for this decision,
and therefore did not confront this reliance.92 The court held that a clear
waiver had been made out.93 Furthermore, the court held that to establish a defense under the public policy exception, a party must show that
an award was arrived at by means “contrary to substantial justice”.94
Relevant to public policy considerations are the availability of local
remedies and the reasonableness of a party’s omission of using them.
When considering the enforcement of a Convention award, the court will
examine the nature of the procedural breach, whether the supervising
jurisdiction’s local remedies were invoked, whether the remedy sought
was unavailable under that jurisdiction, whether the supervisory jurisdiction conclusively upheld the award, and, if a party failed to invoke a
defense, the extent to which that decision was reasonable.95 Under this
fact pattern, the court found that a substantial breach of justice had not
been shown.96 These considerations are similar to Hong Kong’s notion
of requiring a breach of fundamental notions of justice.
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88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id. at 649–50.
Id.. at 650.
Minimetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel, (1999), C.L.C. 647, 653 (Comm.).
Id. at 654.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 657, 661.
Id. at 659.
Minimetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel, (1999), C.L.C. 647, 659 (Comm.)
Id. at 661.
Id. at 662.
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In Singapore, the public policy exception and allegations of procedural defects are similarly disfavored. In Soh Beng Tee v. Fairmound
Development Ltd., a dispute arose concerning the timely completion of
a construction project.97 There, the court refused to set aside a domestic
award, but the court noted that the analysis would be the same as in an
international arbitration proceeding.98 Singapore’s Arbitration Act provides that an award may be set aside by the court if there is a breach of
natural justice which occurs in the making of the award which prejudices
one of the party’s rights—a ground similar to the public policy exception.99 To establish such a breach, a party must show which rule was
breached, how it was breached, in what way the breach was connected
to the making of the award, and how the breach prejudiced that party’s
rights. Elaborating on these principles, the court cited several relevant
factors, including whether arbitrators observed the rules of natural justice and equal treatment, whether there was a failure for the opportunity
to present a case, whether there was opportunity to rebut the opponent’s
argument, whether there was extraneous information in the hearing that
was considered, and whether the requirement for actual prejudice had
been met.100 The court emphasized a restrictive view of public policy.101
The court stressed that one of Singapore’s major public policy concerns
is an interest in efficiency of the alternate dispute resolution process. The
arbitrators’ judgment will not necessarily be disturbed, even if it strikes
a middle path where one party thinks it is wholly in the right.102 This
establishes a large degree of deference towards the arbitral decision, and
is directly related to the purpose of the Arbitration Act, finality.103

Soh Beng Tee v. Fairmound Development Ltd., [2007] 3 SLR(R) 86, 100.
Id. at 102.
99
Id. at 102.
100
Soh Beng Tee [2007] 3 SLR(R) at 113. See also, PT Asurmansi Jasa Indonesia
(Persero), [2006] S.G.C.A. at 617, 619, 622 (holding that a party had the opportunity
to present an argument, albeit possibly only informally, therefore enforcing the award
to promote finality to litigation)(emphasizing a narrow scope to the public policy
exception to enforcement)
101
Soh Beng Tee [2007] 3 SLR(R) at 116.
102
Id. at 120. Cf. Anwar Siraj v. Ting Kong Chung, [2003] 2 S.L.R. (R) 287, 296
(holding that challenges to an arbitrator’s bias and competence are evaluated by
whether the misconduct amounts to a substantial miscarriage of justice, and that this is
determined under an objective test, dismissing a subjective lack of confidence by one
of the parties).
103
Soh Beng Tee [2007] 3 SLR(R) at 130.
97
98

2013

The Public Policy Exception in Hong Kong

129

II. Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings
A. The Underlying Facts
The underlying dispute between the Respondents and Applicants
involved the validity of a Shareholder Transfer Agreement (“Shareholder
Agreement”) under the law of the PRC.104 The applicants were husband
and wife, Gao and Xie, who owned stock in a company that was invested
in a mining venture.105 106 The Respondents were a group of British
Virgin Island (“BVI”) companies,107 which acquired the applicants’
interest in the mining venture through a share transfer agreement.108 The
governing contract contained an arbitration clause, providing for arbitration at the Xi’An Arbitration Commission (“XAC”) in the PRC.109
The applicants sought to revoke the Shareholder Agreement on
the PRC legal ground that it was entered into by taking advantage of
people in a “precarious position.”110 When the Shareholder Agreement
was concluded, the Applicants had been incarcerated for six months
and suffered miserable conditions during their detention.111 According
to the arbitral award, the detainment was due to a management dispute
between the applicants and the commissioner of the mining venture,
which led to minor injuries.112 Furthermore, during their detainment, the
applicants’ family members reached out to Liu Jian Shen, a “person of

Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] H.K.L.R.D 627, 633 (C.A.).
The name of their company was Baijjun. Id. at 632.
106
Baijun and Angola, a BVI company and a respondent in the case, each owned
50% in the “Zhongxin” venture, which operated a coalmine in Changlebao. Id. at 633.
107
Id.
108
Under The Agreement, the Applicants agreed to transfer all of their shares in
Baijun to the first Respondent, Gao Haiyan, [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 633. Later, by a
supplemental agreement, the second Respondent was added as a transferee, such that
the first Respondent received 62% of the transferred shares and the second received
38%. Id. Finally, the Respondents transferred shares to Daynew and Far Orient
Holdings, two other BVI companies. Id.
109
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., 1 [2012] H.K.L.R.D 627, 633 (C.A.).
110
Gao Haiyan, [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 635.
111
Id. at 633
112
Id.
104
105
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influence”,113 in order to “save persons”. 114 According to the Applicants,
this situation led to the Shareholder Agreement. As proof that it was the
result of improper pressure, the applicants cited the difference between
the share prices and the actual capital contributed, as the valuations did
not reflect the value of the mining venture.115 The applicants initiated
proceedings with the XAC.
As is the case in many CIETAC arbitrations and civil proceedings, a mediation process was interwoven with the proceedings.116 The
Applicants alleged that there was agreement to mediate, whereas the
respondents alleged that there was no such agreement, only that they
had indicated a willingness to mediate.117 However, the Respondents
did not object to the mediation during the arbitral proceedings.118 The
tribunal consisted of one arbitrator nominated by the Applicants, one
by the Respondents, and a Chief Arbitrator.119 While not an arbitrator
in the case, Pan Jun Xin, the Secretary General of the XAC,, became
a principal actor in the subsequent aborted mediation.120 Zeng Wei,
a shareholder in Angola, one of the BVI companies, represented the
respondents at the mediation.121
Zhou and Pan were appointed to communicate a 250 million RMB
settlement offer to the Respondents. Pan sent the suggestion to a lawyer
for the applicants.122 They then arranged to meet with Zeng, as opposed
to respondents’ counsel.123 They met for dinner at the Xi’an Shangri-la
Hotel, an informal setting, where Pan and Zhou asked Zeng to “work

Liu Jian Shen was the president of the Xia Yizhilin Group, and a member of
the National People’s Congress. He was also the controller of the Kaiyuan Holding
Company, and was alleged to be a controller of Keyneeye Holdings, Dew Purple, and
Fair Orient. Id.
114
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] H.K.L.R.D 627, 638 (C.A.). The
Applicants evidently believed that Liu could secure their release, an assertion disputed
by the Respondents. Id. at 633.
115
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 636.
116
Id. at 640.
117
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2011] H.K.E.C. 514, ¶ 18 (C.F.I.).
118
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] H.K.L.R.D 627, 645 (C.A.).
119
The Applicants nominated Zhou Jian as an Arbitrator, and The Respondents
nominated Liu Chun Tian. The Chief Arbitrator was Jiang Ping. Id. at 636.
120
Id.
121
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 636.
122
Id.
123
Id.
113
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on” the respondents with regards to the settlement offer.124 According
to Zeng’s testimony, Pan told Zeng the result of the arbitration would
be a valid contract, but that the Respondents would compensate the
Applicants 250 million RMB.125 When the Respondents learned of the
offer, they rejected it. Subsequently, the XAC issued an award invalidating the contracts, and recommended that the Applicants pay the
Respondent’s 50 million RMB, which was a nonbinding provision of
the award.126
The Respondents then appealed to the Beijing Intermediate Court.127
At the Intermediate Court, the Respondents advanced a theory that
the arbitrators had become tainted with bias because of Pan’s influence, which had not been raised during the arbitral proceedings.128 The
Intermediate Court held that Pan’s actions were justified under the XAC
rules, and that the award was otherwise valid.129 The Intermediate Court
ruled in favor of the Applicants.130 The Applicants sought enforcement
in Hong Kong, and were granted leave to enforce the judgment.131
B. The Decisions of the Court of the First Instance (C.F.I.) and
the Court of Appeals (C.A.)
Judge Reynolds, writing for the C.F.I., set aside the leave to enforce
the judgment on public policy grounds.132 Vice President of the Court
of Appeals Tang (“V.P. Tang”), writing for the C.A., overturned.133 The
primary legal issue before the courts was whether the meeting at the
Shangri-la Hotel, cast as a mediation, violated the public policy of
Hong Kong. Both decisions analyzed the issue in the context of waiver,

Id.
Id.
126
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] H.K.L.R.D 627, 639 (C.A.).
127
Id. at 636, 639.
128
Bias refers to the principle that judges and arbitrators, must not only avoid actual
bias, but the appearance of bias to protect the integrity of the judicial system. Gao
Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] H.K.L.R.D 627, 639, 641, 659 (C.A.).
129
The Xi’An Intermediate Court held that the Chief Arbitrator was empowered to
act as a mediator because Article 37 of the X.A.C. Rules provides “mediation may be
chaired by the Arbitral Tribunal or the presiding arbitrator. Gao Haiyan, 1 H.K.L.R.D.
at 640–41.
130
Gao Haiyan, 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 641.
131
Id. at 631.
132
Id. at 632.
133
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D 627, 660 (C.A.).
124
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estoppel, and the relationship between apparent bias and the public
policy exception in Hong Kong.134
1. Waiver
The XAC rules state that:
a party shall be deemed to have waived his or her right
to object where he or she knows or should know that the
Commission, the arbitral tribunal, the counter party and
other persons have failed to comply with any provision
of, or requirements under the Rules, and yet participates
in or proceeds with the arbitration.135
Applying the lead case Hebei Import and Export Co. v. Polytek
Engineering Ltd., the C.F.I. found that a case of waiver had not been
established.136 The waiver theory is primarily concerned with the possibility of litigants “holding complaints up their sleeve at the arbitration
in order to deny or delay relief.”137 Judge Reynolds was concerned the
tribunal may have become prejudiced against the Respondents if they
had complained.138 The matter was complicated further because under
XAC rules, Pan would have determined any allegation of bias against
him.139 The C.F.I. held that one cannot “hold a complaint up their sleeve”
in a case where complaining to the tribunal is useless or may prejudice
that party.
The C.A., however, strongly disagreed with this analysis. V.P. Tang,
wrote that the Respondents had waived the public policy defense because
they had kept an alleged irregularity up their sleeve for later use.140 The
fear of prejudicing the tribunal against the Respondents was an insufficient reason for not complaining, and it effectively barred the tribunal,
which was better positioned to rule on such a matter, from remedying
Waiver refers to the doctrine that a party to an arbitration should raise
procedural issues and defenses before the Tribunal, or otherwise forgo the defense
in later proceedings whereas estoppel refers to the doctrine that once the supervising
jurisdiction renders a decision, it should be respected by the enforcing jurisdiction
absent compelling circumstances. Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polytek Eng’g
Corp., [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 665, 687 (C.F.I.).
135
Gao Haiyan, 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 645-46.
136
Gao Haiyan, [2011] H.K.E.C. 514, ¶ 81 (C.F.I.).
137
Id..
138
Id. at ¶ 87.
139
Id. at ¶¶ 87,88.
140
Gao Haiyan, 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 650.
134
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the alleged defect.141 He went on to say that there would have been no
complaint had the tribunal accepted the Respondents suggestion.142
2. Estoppel
The C.F.I. similarly found that Intermediate Court’s decision did not
constitute estoppel because in applying the public policy exception, the
enforcing court looks to the public policy of its own law, and not the
supervising jurisdiction’s.143 On the issue of estoppel, Tang agreed with
the C.F.I ., but also held that more weight should have been accorded to
the judgment of the Intermediate Court.144 He found that where a supervisory jurisdiction has refused to set aside an award, and the enforcing
jurisdiction refuses to enforce it, the result could be highly unjust.145
The plaintiffs are then deprived of seeking another arbitration and may
not enforce the present decision.146 A court of Hong Kong is ill-placed
to decide what constitutes as taking advantage of people in precarious
positions under PRC law, especially considering there is no analogous
concept under Hong Kong law, and a Mainland court is better suited to
make such judgments.147 Correspondingly, the supervising court will be
in the best position as to what may constitute bias under that law.148 The
C.A. explained that estoppel would only give way when the supervisory
courts are limited in their jurisdiction to interfere, or when they will not
interfere because of corruption.149
3. Apparent Bias & Public Policy
Judge Reynolds held that while a case for actual bias could not be
made out, one for apparent bias could be.150 The standard for apparent
bias is whether the circumstances would cause a fair-minded observer to
apprehend a real risk of bias. Concerning the mediation at the Shangri-la
Hotel, Judge Reynolds cited several disconcerting facts supporting his

141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

Id. at 649.
Id. at 648–49.
Gao Haiyan, [2011] H.K.E.C. 514 ¶¶ 92, 93 (C.F.I.).
Gao Haiyan, [2012] 1 H.K.I.R.D. at 645.
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627, 645 (C.A.).
Id.
Id. at 657.
Id.
Id. at 645.
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2011] H.K.E.C. 514, ¶ 91 (C.F.I.).
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judgment.151 He was concerned that Pan and Zhou, instead of acting
as neutral mediators, acted as advocates.152 To support this contention,
Judge Reynolds examined the award and found that the total awarded
was 25% greater than the applicant’s bottom line.153 Furthermore,
Judge Reynolds found no real calculation of damages for the settlement
request of 250 million RMB.154 Judge Reynolds held that these facts
constituted apparent bias.155
Regarding the med-arb process as a whole, Judge Reynolds commented that the Model Law, much of which is imported into the
Arbitration Ordinance, has safeguards against med-arb. He elaborated
that med-arb is infected with self-apparent problems regarding bias,
and the disclosure of sensitive information may be used in the following proceedings.156 He further emphasized that many arbitrators will
decline to act as mediators in the same dispute because they must take
great pains to eliminate any impression of bias.157
Judge Reynolds then examined whether the public policy exception
to enforcement applies. Here, there were two competing public policy
concerns, finality to litigation and the wrongfulness of upholding an
award tainted by bias.158 Given the recent merger between domestic
and international arbitration in Hong Kong, he compared this award

Pan never asked for the Respondents’ counsel permission to contact the
Respondents, and said Respondent’s counsel was not present at the purported
mediation. The mediation was held in a highly informal venue, and there was a sense of
pressure on the Zeng manifested through the phrase “work on.” He also was concerned
that there was no evidence that Pan was approved by either party. Id. at ¶¶ 22, 44, 46.
152
Gao Haiyan H.K.E.C. at ¶ 61.
153
The Applicants’ bottom line was RMB 200,000. Gao Haiyan, [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D.
627, 658 (C.A.).
154
Gao Haiyan, [2011] H.K.E.C. at ¶ 48.
155
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2011] H.K.E.C. 514, ¶ 91 (C.F.I.).
156
Id. at ¶¶ 71, 72, 75, 76.
157
Id. at ¶ 77.
158
Id. at ¶ 100.
151
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to domestic standards.159 Under Hong Kong public policy, a domestic
award tainted with apparent bias is unenforceable, and Judge Reynolds
reasoned that international awards should receive no more favorability
than domestic ones.160
The C.A. strongly disagreed. It held that only when enforcing an
award would violate Hong Kong’s fundamental principles and notions
of moral justice that an award will be refused under the public policy
ground. It can only be relied on in exceptional cases, such as corruption.161 The main question is whether the party’s opportunity to be heard
by an impartial and independent tribunal is violated and whether that
party’s rights are prejudiced. The C.A. held such as case had not been
reached here.162
The point of the New York Convention and the Arrangement is to
promote enforcement of awards. Refusal of enforcement will typically
be extraordinary, and enforcement should not be denied on the grounds
of technical defects in the rules.163 Framing the conduct of mediation in
such a way, the C.A. allowed for some cultural flexibility and an understanding that divergent legal systems will have very different ways of
looking at things.164 The C.A. was not concerned that Zeng, as opposed
to counsel, was contacted given the circumstances of the case.165 As to
Hong Kong merged the domestic and international regimes in order to simplify
the administration of arbitration. Here, the CFI imported domestic public policy into
the context of international agreements. Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2011]
H.K.E.C. 514, ¶ 100 (C.F.I.).. But see Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polytek Eng.
Co. [1999] H.K.L.R.D. 605, 675 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler
Plymouth Inc, 473 U.S. 614 (1985), for the proposition that public policy grounds in
international commercial arbitration are held to a higher standard than purely domestic
arbitrations).
160
Gao Haiyan, H.K.E.C. at ¶ 101..
161
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627, 660 (C.A.).
162
Id. at 660.
163
Id. at 646.
164
See id. For example, the decision below partially relied on the absence of
Respondents’ counsel. Gao Haiyan, H.K.E.C. at ¶ 46. Tang retorted that a Mainland
Court is better suited to determine the role of a Mainland lawyer, and it is important to
consider how mediations are typically conducted in the place the contract designates.
Gao Haiyan, 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 659.
165
He noted that the Respondents had never actually complained it was Zeng, and not
counsel was contacted Moreover, there was a great deal of confusion as to controlled
the Respondents, and based on Zeng’s testimony for the Respondents, he found that
Zeng had authority to negotiate based on his agreement to let two of the Respondents
to pay more money to settle. Id. at 654.
159

136

THE ARBITRATION BRIEF

Volume 3

the discrepancies in the valuation of the Award, the C.A. noted that it
was not in a position to comment on its correctness.166
To emphasize his point on cultural flexibility, he noted that while
some may be concerned by the informal manner of the mediation,
whether the court should treat such informality with judicial hostility
depends on how mediations are normally conducted in the place designated by the arbitration agreement, introducing a cultural sliding scale
by which awards are examined under the public policy exception.167
III.

Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings in Context

While the C.A. did not elaborate, it found that a case of waiver had
been made out.168 In comparison to previous case law, this ruling reinforces the presumption that if an issue concerning the impartiality of an
arbitrator or a procedural defect arises during the course of the proceedings and is not objected to, that defense is waived. Hebei Import and
Export Co. is distinguishable from Gao Haiyan in this regard. While
both address the proprietary of an arbitrator’s conduct, in Hebei Import
and Export Co., the applicants did not rely on the breach of “fundamental notions of morality and justice” or a public policy ground before
the Beijing Intermediate Court.169 Therefore, taking Hebei Import and
Export Co.and Gao Haiyan together, the immediate effect of the holding in Gao Haiyan with regards to waiver, is to stress that waiver can be
made by not raising an issue before the supervising jurisdiction, or the
arbitral tribunal.
Other cases illustrate the importance of waiver when seeking
enforcement on public policy grounds in Hong Kong. For example, in
Xiamen Xinjingdi, the respondents’ waiver played a role in the denial of
their claim. While the respondents did not go before the Intermediate
Court in that case, the fact that they could have raised their claim in

Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627, 657 (C.A.). The
C.A. also noted that people connected to the Respondents were in fact trying to raise
R.M.B. 250,000,000 when the Award was made reinforcing its validity. Id. See also A
v. R [2009] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 389, 397 (C.F.I.)(granting enforcement where a liquidated
damages provision was not litigated before the arbitral tribunal).
167
Gao Haiyan, 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 659
168
Id. at 645.
169
Hebei Import and Export Corp. v. Polytek Eng’g Co., [1999] H.K.L.R.D. 665, 669
(C.F.I.).
166
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either the first or second arbitration was central to the case’s holding.170
Practitioners must also be aware of the necessity to raise the complaint
formally before the tribunal, as simply unilaterally complaining to a
single arbitrator will not suffice.171 It is necessary to make an effort to
exhaust local remedies to the fullest extent possible.172 However, with
the use of waiver, not all factual defenses are treated equally. It remains
an open question whether a party can waive a defense based on the
illegality of a contract.173
An issue analogous to waiver is the weight put on the supervising
jurisdiction’s decision, at instant the intermediate courts. A party is faced
with two choices when a Mainland award is granted against it. They
may simply wait and resist the award at enforcement, risking waiver for
not exhausting local remedies and keeping defenses “up the sleeve,”174
or raise the issue before the Intermediate Court and risk estoppel by that
court.175 The primary concern is whether the arguments were withheld
in good faith, or whether it is a tactical decision to delay the applicant
from enjoying the fruits of the award.176 Under Hong Kong public
policy, there is a very strong public policy consideration for upholding
the decisions of supervising jurisdictions. This is primarily to reinforce
principles of comity,177 and ensure that plaintiffs are not barred from

Compare Xiamen Xinjingdi Grp. Ltd., [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 353, 360 (C.A.), with
Pacific China Holdings Ltd. v. Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd, [2007] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 741
(C.F.I.) (refusing enforcement where the applicants’ did not complain of unilateral
communications between an arbitrator and the respondents). See also A v. R [2009] 3
H.K.L.R.D. 389, 397 (C.F.I.) (holding where a party does not complain about liquidated
damages before the arbitral tribunal, those damages are presumed reasonable).
171
China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corp. Shenzhen Branch, [1995] 2 H.K.L.R. at
217, 223 (H.C.).
172
See id.
173
Shandong Textiles Import and Export Corp. v. Da Hua Non-Ferrous Metals Co.,
[2002] H.K.F.C. 844, 852 (C.F.I.).
174
Hebei Import and Export v. Polytek Eng’g Co., [1999] H.K.L.R.D. 665, 688
(C.F.I.). See also, Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd., [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 358. See also,
China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corp. Shenzhen Branch, [1995] 2 H.K.L.R. 215 at
223, 224 (H.C.) (enforcing a CIETAC award because the defendants did not exhaust
local remedies, and would not have complained if they had won).
175
See Gao Haiyan, [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627 (C.F.I.).
176
Hebei Import and Export, H.K.L.R.D. at 690.
177
A v. R [2009] 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 393.
170
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relief by being unable to reconvene an arbitration or enforce the current
award.178
Gao Haiyan reinforces these policy considerations. The C.A.
expressly stated that it felt the C.F.I. did not accord proper weight to the
decision of the Intermediate Court,179 and that by refusing enforcement
substantial injustice could ensue.180 The C.A. and Hong Kong courts
generally tend to value the decision of the supervising jurisdiction unless
an extreme case arises. For example, in Shantou Seng Ping Xu Yueli Shu
Kuao Trading Co. v. Wescro Polymers Ltd. the respondents attacked an
award on the basis of an illegal contract.181 The Beijing Intermediate
Court rejected this argument, and the C.F.I. held that it would enforce
the award as a matter of comity.182
The C.A. reinforced these principles, but this should not deter parties from applying for relief in the intermediate courts of China. There
are cases where the supervising jurisdiction’s decision will be granted
significantly less weight, particularly in cases where fraud or corruption are used to procure an award.183 Furthermore, some public policy
defenses are not subject to estoppel defenses. Hong Kong courts will
not ignore actual bias,184 as opposed to the appearance of bias in the
principal case.185 However, claims based simply on factual disputes will
not trigger the public policy exception.186 Also, depending on the nature
of the contract, contracts which are unenforceable often preclude the

Gao Haiyan, [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 645.
Gao Haiyan, [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 650.
180
Id. See also Shanghai City Foundation Works Corp. v. Sunlink Ltd., [2001]
H.C.C.T. no. 83 of 200 (H.C.).
181
Shantou Seng Ping Xu Yueli Shu Kuao Trading Co. v. Wescro Polymers Ltd., [2002]
H.K.E.C. 76, ¶ 14 (C.F.I.).
182
Id. at ¶ 17. See also, Kunming Factory of Prestressed Vibrohydropressed Concrete
Pipe v. True Stand Investments, [2006] H.K.E.C. 2267, ¶ 13 (C.F.I.) (enforcing an
award where the Beijing Intermediate Court had ruled against the Respondents on an
issue of the procedure used to constitute the arbitral body).
183
Shandong Textiles Import and Export Corp. v. Da Hua Non-Ferrous Metals
Co., [2002] H.K.F.C. 844, 860 (C.F.I.). See also, JJ Agro Industries Ltd. v. Texuna
Ineternational Ltd., [1994] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 89 (C.F.I.) (kidnapping of a witness held to
be fraud and contrary to public policy).
184
Hebei Import and Export v. Polytek Eng’g Co., [1999] H.K.L.R.D. 665, 676
(C.F.I.).
185
Gao Haiyan, [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 660.
186
Shantou Seng Ping Xu Yueli Shu Kuao Trading Co. [2002] H.K.E.C. at ¶ 18.
178
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estoppel defense.187 A failure to raise a public policy ground will not fail
for estoppel where the public policy of the enforcing and supervisory
jurisdictions are so disparate that the defense being asserted was not
available at the supervisory jurisdiction.188
The instant case does not change these principles. The breach
described was never raised at the arbitral tribunal, and because the C.A.
found that the Respondents were effectively holding an argument up
their sleeve on a possible technical breach of the rules, the claim failed.189
The Respondents claim did not rise to the level of fraud, corruption, or
a failure to present their case. In fact, the Respondents emphasized they
were not even complaining of actual bias, but apparent bias.190 These
sorts of technical violations are the exact sort that the narrow construction of the public policy exception seeks to avoid.
The C.A. held that an appearance of bias cannot give rise to a public
policy claim, but rather that actual bias was required.191 Apparent bias is
established if the fair-minded observer would have a real apprehension
that an arbitrator may favor a party. It is a lower bar than required for
actual bias, though if the case for apparent bias is strong enough, it can
lead to an inference of actual bias.192 When confronted with a procedural breach that may give rise to apparent bias in Hong Kong courts, a
party must assert that claim before the tribunal in order to have a chance
of substantiating it and succeeding on an inference of actual basis in
enforcement actions before Hong Kong courts. Furthermore, in cases
that involve the potential impropriety of an arbitrator, this must result in
actually prejudicing the respondents’ case.193 Gao Haiyan emphasizes
this point, even if indirectly. Nothing in the Respondents’ argument
claimed that Pan’s conduct amounted to actual bias, which was a strong
Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co., [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 735
(holding a mediation and concilliation clause’s ambiguity rendered the whole contract
unenforceable). But see Shantou Seng Ping Xu Yueli Shu Kuao Trading Co. v. Wesco
Polymers Ltd., [2002] H.K.E.C. 76 (C.F.I.) (holding that an allegedly illegal contract
for incapacity could be enforced because the issue had not been raised at the tribunal,
and the issue was merely a dispute of fact).
188
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consideration in the C.A. decision.194 Practitioners who wish to rely on
the misconduct of the arbitrator therefore must specifically demonstrate
how the communications, or here the mediation, actually prejudiced
them. This is largely to avoid allowing abuse of process.195
As previously discussed, the public policy exception is narrow in
Hong Kong, and where a court can rely on another ground to deny
enforcement, such as failure to present a case, the court will do so.196
Preclusion from presenting a case is a common alternative ground in
cases involving the arbitrators’ impropriety. This ground is available
both under PRC law197 and Hong Kong law.198 However, relying on this
ground is very sensitive to whether whatever violation alleged to take
place is objected to at the tribunal,199 and whether this alleged breach
was determinative in some way of the outcome.200 Cases of extreme
deprivation of due process, such as being denied the opportunity to
cross examine a witness or challenge evidence, will also trigger a denial
of enforcement without regard to waiver or estoppel.201 In the principal
case, this ground was not relied on, but rather the Respondents chose
to rely on the public policy exception exclusively. However, it should
be noted this is likely because of their failure to object at the tribunal.
This alternate ground of relief should provide some comfort to those
advocating a broader public policy exception.
Hong Kong has a strong public policy emphasis on the finality to
litigation, and like other leading jurisdictions narrowly construes the
public policy exception. Here, there were strong interests in comity
See Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627, 659 (C.A.).
See, e.g., A v. R [2009] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 389, 397 (C.F.I.) (where the court found that
Respondents committed an abuse of process because they did not raise the liquidated
damages isues before the arbitral tribunal).
196
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(H.C.).
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71.
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[2009] 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 397.
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at issue. If the C.A. had refused enforcement on the basis of apparent
bias, where the Respondents agreed there were no allegations of actual
bias,202 the decision would have opened wide avenues of attack on
Chinese arbitral and civil judgments. Mediation is tightly intertwined
with the entire Chinese judicial process, and as the Mainland’s economy
grows, there will be more and more cases that will involve med-arb
procedures conducted in China. It is not in Hong Kong’s public policy
interests to offer such a wide range of attack. In fact, considering the
pervasiveness of mediation in Sinic culture, a contrary decision would
have undermined the pro-enforcement bias of both the Convention and
the Arrangement.
Parties are not without recourse if they are unwilling to mediate in
China. First, in the principal case it seems there was at least an indication that the parties assented to a mediation.203 And while party’s at
times may find themselves unwilling participants in mediations, the
new CIETAC rules allow for severing the mediation and arbitration
processes.204 While Chinese parties will press for CIETAC arbitration,
foreign parties now may apply for the use of other arbitral rules, such
as UNICTRAL or the rules of the ICC in CIETAC arbitrations.205 These
safeguards, along with careful drafting, should allow a party to mitigate
the negative effects of mediation procedures in the PRC.
The decision of the C.A. given Hong Kong’s cultural and legal traditions, and political situation, is understandable. However, it presents
several difficulties for businesses by precluding apparent bias under
the public policy exception, and more importantly, introducing cultural
considerations to the roles of fiduciaries, such as lawyers and agents,
and the context of a mediation. The concept of guanxi and the inconsistency of CIETAC, the arbitral tribunal authorized to resolve foreign
related disputes, provide serious challenges.
Corruption in the Chinese judicial system is well documented,
and a source of frustration for many businesses.206 Arbitration through
CIETAC is the primary dispute resolution mechanism employed when
Gao Haiyan, [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 107.
Gao Haiyan, [2011] H.K.E.C. at ¶ 18.
204
Song, supra note 35, 311.
205
CIETAC Rules Article 4 (3).
206
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a dispute concerns a foreign related matter or foreign party.207 However,
many investors have found arbitration through CIETAC to be unreliable and inconsistent.208 Given that many of the mediations conducted
through CIETAC are conducted by the very same arbitrators who preside over the tribunals, the same issues regarding consistency and corruption arise. Exacerbating the issue is the Chinese cultural concept of
guanxi, defined as a process by which an individual may assist another
in the resolution of a problem in exchange for further assistance, which
is particularly influential in business.209 It plays a prominent role in state
level corruption, particularly considering China’s political structure
which was “rule by men instead of rule be law[.]”210 Guanxi acts as
the principle which marries money and power in state organs.211 This
guanxi driven corruption extends to the judicial system.212 Gao Haiyan’s
elimination of apparent bias as a grounds for refusal under the public
policy doctrine, while understandable given Hong Kong’s cultural and
political position in the world, presents a serious problem for foreigners
doing business in China. Whereas apparent bias is determined from an
objective perspective, actual bias requires a higher threshold. Because
of guanxi’s forward looking design of trading benefits, it may be much
more difficult to detect and prove in court.213 While these obstacles are
not insurmountable, they are significant. The best safeguard against
them when seeking to resist or potentially enforce an Mainland Chinese
award in Hong Kong is careful contract drafting.
The Arbitration Law of China provides for optional conciliation.214 Conforming with these provisions, CIETAC Rules provide that
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conciliation may be provided by the arbitral tribunal,215 but if the parties
elect to have the dispute mediated outside of the tribunal, “CIETAC
may, with the consent of both parties, assist the parties to conciliate the
dispute in a manner and procedure it considers appropriate (emphasis
added).”216 Chinese laws are intentionally drafted with broad language
in order to encourage varying interpretations, and the emphasized language provides little comfort to those who wish to engage in mediation
through CIETAC while sanitizing the process of potential corruption,
apparent bias, and estoppel issues. There is another option. CIETAC
recently changed its rules and provides that:
Where the parties agree to refer their dispute to CIETAC
for arbitration but have agreed on a modification of these
Rules or have agreed on the application of other arbitration rules, the parties’ agreement shall prevail unless
such agreement is inoperative or in conflict with a mandatory provision of the law as it applies to the arbitration
proceedings. Where the parties have agreed on the application of other arbitration rules, CIETAC shall perform
the relevant administrative duties.217
This is a major advantage. It allows for the parties to functionally
abrogate Article 45(8) and replace it with a more stringent procedure.
For example, the parties could agree to terms which set out strict timetables, incorporate ICC Rules or UNICTRAL Rules, and nominate in
advance members of CIETAC’s Panel of Arbitrators. While the negotiation cost may be an issue, this would eliminate the risk of apparent bias
by walling off the arbitrators in the tribunal. Furthermore, a contractual
provision providing for the use of HKIAC Rules as interpreted by Hong
Kong courts, as consistent with the Chinese Arbitration Law, may reduce
the risk of estoppel. Regardless of any contractual provision included,
it is important that the interested party does not waive its rights through
its actions or express waiver. This provides protection against estoppel,
not waiver.

China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration
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Should a nominated arbitrator be unavailable, there is additional
recourse. CIETAC provides an abundant source of foreign arbitrators.
The Arbitration Law of China requires that arbitration commissions use
arbitrators from its Panel of Arbitrators, which consists of 998 arbitrators. 44 are from Hong Kong, and 218 are foreign arbitrators.218 In order
to qualify as an approved arbitrator the prospective candidate must meet
one of several conditions.219 But when a paneled arbitrator is unavailable to serve as a mediator, CIETAC Rules allow for the nomination
of arbitrators to serve as mediators who are not on CIETAC’s Panel of
Arbitrators.220 The selected prospective mediators would still have to
conform with the mandatory requirements of Article 15 of the China
Arbitration Law.
There is one final avenue to ensure protection, and its utilization
depends on the negotiating strengths of the respective parties. CIETAC
Rules provide:
Where the parties have agreed on the place of the arbitration, the parties’ agreement shall prevail, [but] [w]here
the parties have not agreed on the place of arbitration
or their agreement is ambiguous, the place of arbitration
shall be the domicile of CIETAC or its sub-comissioner
[or] center administrating the case. CIETAC may also
determine the place of arbitration to be another location
having regard to the circumstances of the case.
This would allow for a CIETAC administered arbitration to take
place in Hong Kong. This would presumably subject CIETAC arbitrations to the supervising jurisdiction’s mandatory law, in Hong Kong
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the Arbitration Ordinance. In the context of a med-arb proceeding, the
Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance provides significant safeguards. If
an arbitrator is to act as a mediator, the parties must consent to such
a proceeding in writing.221 Moreover, if an arbitrator gains access to
confidential information and no settlement is reached, the arbitrator
must “disclose to all other parties as much of that information as the
arbitrator considers is material to the arbitration proceedings.”222 Lastly,
the prospective award would be subject to confirmation in the courts of
Hong Kong.
Conclusion
Although med-arb proceedings have inherent problems, the CA’s
decision reflected cultural and political realities. If the CA had opened
the scope of attack in the context of med-arb, because of the role mediation plays in the PRC, this would prejudice a large number of awards and
decisions rendered in the PRC. Given Hong Kong’s narrow interpretation of the public policy exception, and its close cultural and historical
relationship with the PRC, this was the most sensible decision in the
case. To buttress the potential pitfalls of this decision, foreign parties
should expend more in negotiating process in order to ensure a fair and
impartial resolution of their potential disputes through contract drafting
which takes advantage of CIETAC’s rules and the local arbitration laws
of China and Hong Kong.
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